THE PROTECTION OF LABORERS AND
MATERIALMEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION BONDS*-Part II
MORTON C. CAMPBELL t

II. OTHER FORMS OF BONDS WHICH CONCEIVABLY MAY PROTECT
PERSONS FURNISHING LABOR OR MATERIALS
A. BONDS SECURING A CONTRACTUAL UNDERTAKING OF THE PRINCIPAL
TO FURNISH LABOR AND MATERIALS-PROTECTION OF THE OWNER'

F THE contractual undertaking is that the builder shall furnish labor
and materials "at his own expense," it is evidently designed for the
protection of the owner against claims of the builder and of all other
persons and hence its meaning would seem to be: (i) to exclude the
builder from claiming from the owner any compensation, other than the
contract price, for furnishing the requisite labor and materials, whether
the former already owns the materials or later procures labor or materials
for cash or on credit; and (2) to save the owner harmless from any claims
which unpaid laborers or materialmen might have against the owner or his
property. Accordingly, if the owner comes under matured, personal responsibility for the payment of any such claim,2 or if his property becomes
subject to a matured lien to secure such payment (as is frequently the case
in private construction), and the owner pays the claim, he is obviously
entitled to indemnity from the principal, or from his surety if the latter
executed a bond conditioned on performance of the contract.
The like law governs situations (i) where the contract of the builder is
to furnish labor and materials, although the words "at his own expense"
are omitted, 3 for the furnishing thereof without additional expense to the
* Part I of this article appeared in the December, '935, issue of the Review,

3 Univ. Chi.

L. Rev. 1 (1935).

t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
xWhile this sub-topic is not strictly within the subject of this article, it has been thought
wise to consider it in view of its close connection with the following sub-topic.
2 For example, by reason of guaranty; or by reason of statutory liability arising from a failure to procure a surety bond protecting such persons.
3 Callan v. Empire State Surety Co., 20 Cal. App. 483,491, 129 Pac. 978, 98 (93) (surety
company; contract to furnish all materials and labor; overruling Boas v. Maloney, 138
Cal. 1o5, 70 Pac. 1004 (1902), a case involving individual sureties and a contract to furnish
labor and materials and to complete); Mayes v. Lane, iz6 Ky. 566, 572, 76 S.W. 399, 4o
(i903) (individual sureties); Stoddard v. Hibbler, 156 Mich. 335, 12o N.W. 787, 24 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1075 (1909) (contract to furnish all labor and materials; bond to save owner harmless
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owner is implied;4 and (2) even where the contract is merely to build and
complete, because the furnishing of labor and materials necessary to that
end without further expense to the owner is implied.5 Furthermore, even
when a lien has been filed but not paid, the owner has been given judg6
ment against the surety for the amount thereof.
The foregoing discussion concerns the right of an owner who is personally responsible, or whose property is subject to liens, for the payment of
claims for labor or materials. If the owner is not under such risk, for example, when it is a public body and the property in public use, then the
mere existence of liens on the fund, that is, on the contract price owing
from the owner to the contractor, and hence on the latter's property, will
not constitute such damage to the owner as to justify recovery by him on
the surety bond.7
from breach of contract); Wheeler, Osgood & Co. v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash. 630, 45 Pac.
316 (x896) (circuity of action); Crowley v. United States F. & G. Co., 29 Wash. 268, 275, 69
Pac. 784, 786 (1902) (contract to furnish labor and materials, and to construct). See Howard v.

Fisher,

86 Colo. 493, 510, 283

Pac.

1042, 1049 (1930).

Thus, in J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Miner Township School Dist., 56 S.D. 586, 230
N.W. 23 (I93o), the contract between a school district and a builder required the latter to furnish labor and materials, and the bond executed by a surety company was conditioned on performance of the contract, but not on payment of laborers and materialmen as a statute required
that it should be; by favor of that statute a materialman recovered judgment against the owner
for the amount of his claim; the owner was properly held to be entitled to indemnity from the
surety because the builder had failed to furnish the materials without expense to the owner.
4 J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Miner Township School Dist., supranote 3 (per Burch, J.).
5 Closson v. Billman, 161 Ind. 61o, 616, 69 N.E. 449, 451 (I9O4). In that case the materialman was himself surety on the contractor's bond; in a suit brought by him to foreclose his
lien, it was properly held that the owner had a defence on the ground of circuity of action.
McRae v. University of the South, 52 S.W. 463, 466 (Tenn. Ch. 1898).
Contra: Gato v. Warrington, 37 Fla. 542, 19 So. 883 (I896) (contract to erect, finish and
deliver; individual sureties; strict construction of bond).
6 Kiewit v. Carter, 25 Neb. 460, 41 N.W. 286 (1889) (contract to "furnish material");
J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Miner Township School Dist., 56 S.D. 586, 230 N.W. 23 (1930);
Friend v. Ralston, 35 Wash.

422,

77 Pac. 794 (904).

The writer submits, however, that these cases go too far, because the owner has not yet
suffered damage. He is not out of pocket. Nor is he under a sole risk: the builder is liable to
and may yet have to pay the person furnishing labor or materials, the consequence being that
the owner's property would be freed from the lien; moreover, if the owner collects from the
builder or his surety and does not pay such person, the builder may be subjected to double payment. The owner's proper redress is specific performance in equity. The writer recognizes,
however, that if the obligation of the surety is not merely to save the owner harmless but to
pay persons furnishing labor or materials, as the court held in Friend v. Ralston, supra, the
weight of authority in analogous situations supports an action at law by the owner for the
amount of the lien. See 2 Sedgwick, Damages §§ 788-795 (9th ed. 1913); cf. 38 Harv. L. Rev.
502 (1925).

7 Village of Argyle v. Plunkett, 226 N.Y. 3o6, X24 N.E. i (1gig) (even though the bond is
also conditioned on payment of persons furnishing labor or materials).
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B. BONDS SECURING A CONTRACTUAL UNDERTAING OF THE PRINCIPAL TO
FURNISH LABOR AND MATERIALS-PROTECTION OF PERSONS
8
FURNISHNG LABOR OR MATERMLS

In the preceding sub-topic it was found that protection is usually given
to the owner. It remains to be considered whether any right or other
protection is to be given to persons furnishing labor or materials. The
contract between owner and builder, standing alone, could not reasonably
be interpreted as conferring rights on such persons against the builder,
because he would be bound anyhow as employer or purchaser. Furthermore, even when considered in the light of the surety bond, which was then
given or was about to be given to secure performance of all its provisions,
the contract can scarcely be interpreted as vesting rights in persons furnishing labor or materials against the builder with a view to giving them
redress against the surety on the bond. The contract and the bond run to
the owner, and laborers and materialmen are not mentioned therein specifically or as a class; moreover, they frequently have liens on the property, which ordinarily give full protection, or at least on the fund, that is,
the unpaid contract price, and so have partial protection. It seems, therefore, that the contract and bond should be referred exclusively to the protection of the owner, and persons furnishing labor or materials denied any

right against the surety. 9
Furthermore, when the materialman

°

has no claim against the owner

$Authorities pertinent to this sub-topic are collected in 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 573, 591 (1910),
Ann. Cas. x96A 754, 756, 759, 77 A.L.R. 21, 64, ioi (1932).
9Sun Indemnity Co. v. American University, 58 App. D. C. 184, 26 F. (2d) 556 (1928);
Morgantown Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, z65 N.C. 285, 8i S.E. 418 (1914), Ann. Cas. 19i6A 763
(contract to provide all materials and perform all work; surety company; lien on fund);
Yawkey-Crowley Lumber Co. v. De Longe, 157 Wis. 390, 147 N.W. 334 (1914) (contract to
provide all the materials and perform all the work; surety company; lien on property). Aforlori, if the bond is conditioned merely on the builder's doing the work; Crane Co. v. Borwick
Trenching Corp., Ltd., 138 Cal. App. 39, 32 P. (2d) 387 (1934).
Contra: Lichtentag v. Feitel, 113 La. 931, 37 So. 88o (i9o5) (contract to furnish labor and
material; individual surety; materialman had claim against the owner and lien on his prop-

erty).
In Pacific States Electric Co. v. United States F. & G. Co.,

1o9

Cal. App. 691, 293 Pac. 812

(1930), S-2, a surety company bound on the bond of P-2, a sub-contractor, to P, a contractor,

conditioned on the performance of the sub-contract, was held liable to M, who furnished materials to P-2, although the contract between P and P-2 merely obligated P-2 to "furnish
materials"; the court said (i) that it made no difference that S, surety for the contractor, was
liable to M for the same materials (on a bond conditioned that P should pay the claims of
all persons furnishing materials to be used in the work), and (2) that if M exacted payment
from S the latter would be subrogated to the former's right against S-2. The writer disagrees
with the decision that M bad a right against S-2, but agrees with the dictum that if M had such
a right S would have an equity of subrogation therein.
loWhat is said in this sub-topic concerning the materialman is equally applicable to one
furnishing labor or (if the coverage of the bond be wide enough) supplies, tools, machinery,
board, money, etc.
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or his property (as is usually true when the owner is the United States, a
state, a municipality or other public body, and the property used for a
public purpose), the provision of the contract calling for the furnishing of
labor and materials, with or without the words "at the contractor's sole
expense," can reasonably be attributed to abundant caution on the part
of the owner and regarded as meant to bar the contractor from any claim
for additional compensation, whether the materials be already owned by
him or the labor and materials are to be procured by him for cash or on
credit. In spite of the desirability of ascribing meaning to all words of a
contract, the writer believes that it is going too far to look on this language
as conferring protection on the unpaid materialman when the undertakings and conditions of contract and bond run only to the owner and materialmen are not mentioned therein generally or specifically.", Hence, by
the better view, in such cases the materialman has no right against the
surety, whether the latter be a friendly"2 or a professional surety, 13 and
"1See reasoning of Otis, J., in Minneapolis Steel & Mach. Co. v. Federal Sur. Co., 34 F. (2d)
(C.C.A. 8th 1929).
A fortiori is this interpretation sound, if the materialmen are given liens on the fund, that
is, the balance due from the public body to the builder, even though it may turn out to be less
than the aggregate of the liens. Hunter v. Boston, 218 Mass. 535, xo6 N.E. 145 (1914).
12 City of Sterling v. Wolf, 163 Ill. 467, 45 N.E. 218 (1896); Greenfield Lumber Co. v. Par270, 273

ker, i5g Ind. 571, 65 N.E. 747 (1902) (contract by builder to provide labor and materials at
own cost); Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Independent School Dist., 121 Iowa 663, 97 N.W. 72
(i9o3) (contract to furnish labor and materials and deliver free from liens); Carr & Baal Co. v.
Consolidated Dist., 187 Iowa 930, 174 N.W. 780 (i919); Fellows v. Kreutz, x89 Mo. App. 547,
551, 176 S.W. io8o, io81 (i915) (dictum); Van Clief & Sons, Inc. v. City of New York, 14'
Misc. 216, 252 N.Y.S. 402 (I93I); McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708,
go S.E. ioio (i916); Montgomery v. Rief, 15 Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 (x897) (contract to furnish
all material and perform labor); Puget Sound Brick Co. v. School Dist., 12 Wash. 118, 40 Pac.
6o8 (i895) (contract to furnish materials); also cases cited in note i5, infra.
Contra: W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Alturas School Dist., 28 Cal. App. 6og, 153 Pac. 743 (1915);
Crane Co. v. Borwick Trenching Corp., Ltd., 138 Cal. App. 319, 32 P. (2d) 387 (i934), distinguishes the Fuller case on the ground that here the bond was merely conditioned on performance of the work contracted for and not on performance of the contract generally.
In Illinois it has been held that even though the bond, by reference to the contract, is conditioned on the contractor's "furnishing and payingfor" materials, since nothing is said about
paying the materialtnen, there is no manifested intention that the provision is for their benefit,
and hence they have no rights on the bond. Searles v. City of Flora, 225 Ill. 167, 172, 8o N.E.
98, 100 (1907); People v. Merkle, 269 Ill. App. 449 (I933). One wonders how materials could be
paid for without paying the persons who furnish the same.
"3Minneapolis Steel & Mach. Co. v. Federal Sur. Co., 34 F. (2d) 270 (C.C.A. 8th i929)
(alternative decision); also cases cited in note i5, infra; Standard Oil Co. v. National Sur. Co.,
234 Ky. 764, 29 S.W. (2d) 29 (1930) (contract to furnish materials and perform labor; contract
price to include payment for same; Wilson v. Nelson, 54 Okla. 457, 153 Pac. 1179 (1916).
Contra: Royal Ind. Co. v. Northern Ohio Granite & Stone Co., ioo Ohio St. 373, 126 N.E.
405 (1919), 12 A.L.R. 378 (contract to do all work and furnish all material at own expense;
bond conditioned on performance of contract and saving city harmless from all claims); Mack
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whether bound for the contractor to the owner, or for a subcontractor to
the contractor. X4 Moreover, it has been so held when a statute required
the taking of a bond conditioned that the principal would pay persons
furnishing labor or materials and the particular bond expressed no such
condition; S this seems to be a sound interpretation, although it must be
conceded that the existence of the statute is a circumstance making in
favor of the materialman, especially if the omission would expose the
public body or the officer accepting the bond to criminal or civil liability.,6
Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., i03 S.C. 55, 71, 87 S.E. 439, 443 (1915) (alternative decision); Standard Oil Co. v. Powell Paving Co., 139 S.C. 411, 138 S.E. 184 (1927) (alternative decision; ib. 140 S.C. 39 and 144 S.C. 354, z38 S.E. 544 and 142 S.E. 612).
14 Dunlap v. Eden, iS Ind. App. 575, 44 N.E. 56o (i896) (individual sureties).
is Babcock v. American Surety Co., 236 Fed. 34o (C.C.A. 8th i916) ("furnish all materials"); United States, for use of W. B. Young Supply Co. v. Stewart, 288 Fed. 187 (C.C.A. 8th
1923) (surety company); United States, to use of Zambetti, v. American Fence Const. Co.,
rS F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A. 2d 1926) (surety company); United States, to use of Stallings, v. Starr,
2o F. (2d) 83 (C.C.A. 4th 1927) (surety company; "construct at their own expense"); Daughtry v. Maryland Cas. Co., 48 F. (2d) 786, 788 (C.C.A. 4 th i931) (dictum;) Warner v. Halyburton, 187 N.C. 414, 121 S.E. 756 (1924) ("provide labor and material at their own expense";
individual surety; public officer guilty of misdemeanor by omission); Wilson v. Nelson, 54
Okla. 457, 153 Pac. 1179 (i916) ("furnish all labor and materials"; surety company); Hardison
& Co. v. Yeaman, ix5 Tenn. 639, 91 S.W. irii (19o6) (officers criminally and civilly responsible; but bond of surety company provided that surety should not be liable "to anyone except
the owner"); Tennessee Supply Co. v. Bina Young & Son, 142 Tenn. r42, 218 S.W. 225 (i919)
(officers criminally and civilly responsible; surety company). See Gill v. Paysee, 48 Nev. 12,
29, 226 Pac. 302, 308 (1924) (Ducker, C. J.; "provide all the materials and perform all the
work"); and Electric Appliance Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 110 Wis. 434, 85 N.W. 648

(igoi).
Contra: Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 295, 264 S.W. 879, 881 (1924) (contract "to provide

all materials and perform all work"; alternative decision); Nye-Scbneider-Fowler Co. v. Roeser, io3 Neb. 614, 6x8, 173 N.W. 6o5, 607 (igrg) (contract "to erect"; alternative decision,
reversed on other grounds in io4 Neb. 389, 177 N.W. 750 (1920)).
26In Sailing v. Morrell, 97 Neb. 454, i5o N.W. 195 (914), however, a statute made it the
duty of school trustees to exact a bond conditioned on the principal's paying laborers; they

accepted a bond merely conditioned on performance of the contract, which required the principal to "provide all materials and perform all work." In an action brought by a laborer against
the trustees, judgment was rendered for the defendants on the grounds (i) that the bond indirectly protected the laborer and hence he suffered no damage, and at any rate (2) that it was
not proved that the trustees acted in bad faith.
Of course, if a court accepts the doctrine that a bond given because required by statute

impliediy incorporates the provisions of the statute, the materialman will prevail against the
surety. Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 293, 264 S.W. 879, 88o (1924) (alternative decision);
Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co. v. Roeser, supra note iS (alternative decision); Gill v. Paysee, 48
Nev. 12, 22, 226 Pac. 302, 3o6 (1924) (Coleman, J.).
It is clear that, if the statute provides that a bond given thereunder shall have the same

legal effect as if the condition protecting laborers and materialmen were written therein, they
will be protected accordingly even though the bond contains no provision to that effect. Coin-
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Furthermore, even if the contract states or stipulates that the principal
gives or shall give a bond with sufficient surety conditioned on payment of
laborers and materialmen, and the surety bond given is not so expressly
conditioned but only on performance of all the provisions of the contract,
an action does not lie in favor of the materialman against the surety on
any theory that the bond was impliedly conditioned on the payment of
their claims ;17 nor, it seems, for damages resulting from the principal's failure to give a bond in the originally stipulated form, for the tender and
acceptance of a bond in different form constituted an effective discharge
of the stipulation of the contract.,'
mercial Bank of Magee v. Evans, 145 Miss. 643, 65I, 112 So. 482 (1927); Standard Electric
Time Co., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., ii N.C. 653, 656, X32 S.E. 808, 809 (1926) (alternative decision); Southern Sur. Co. v. Chambers, i15 Ohio St. 434, 154 N.E. 786 (1926).
. For collections of authorities dealing with the liability of the municipality to laborers
and
materialmen for failing to take the required bond or a bond in the required form, see notes,
L.R.A. 19i5F 629, Ann. Cas. 1917B io8g, and 64 A.L.R. 678 (1929); with the liability of the
public officer, see notes, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1i99 (X914), Ann. Cas. 19 17B 1o89, 1092, and 64

A.L.R. 678

(1929).

Babcock v. American Sur. Co., 236 Fed. 340, 341 (C.C.A. 8th 1916); and cases cited in
note i8, infra;United States, to use of Stallings, v. Starr, 20 F. (2d) 803 (C.C.A. 4 th 1927).
In Daughtry v. Maryland Casualty Co., 48 F. (2d) 786, 788 (C.C.A. 4 th 1931), however,
the additional facts were present that the bond was expressed by the contract to be, and actually was, executed concurrently therewith, and the contract was attached to the bond and was
so referred to therein; it was held that the bond was impliedly conditioned on payment of
materiahnen. And see Southwestern Sash & Door Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 37
N.M. 212, 215, 20 P. (2d) 928, 930 (1933).
Of course, if the contract stipulates that the principal shall pay laborers and materialmen,
and not merely give bond to pay them, the surety is bound to such persons by virtue of the
general condition of the bond. Peake v. United States, i6 App. D.C. 415, 419 (i9oo).
Moreover, if the same surety executed a "bid" bond, though in much smaller amount, conditioned on the principal's entering into proper contract and furnishing a bond securing performance thereof and payment of all claims for labor and materials, the "bid" bond of the
surety has been held to indicate that the final bond was intended to comply therewith though
explicit protection of the materialman was omitted therefrom. American Guar. Co. v. Cliff
Co., 115 Ohio St. 524, 531, 155 N.E. 127, 129 (1926) (alternative decision).
18United States, for use of W. B. Young Supply Co., v. Stewart, 288 Fed. 187, I89 (C.C.A.
8th 1923); Builders Material & Supply Co. v. Evans Const. Co., 204 Mo. App. 76, 86, 221
S.W. 142, 145 (1920) (public construction); Crum v. Jenkins, 145 S.C. 177, 187, 143 S.E. 21,
24 (1928) (alternative decision; private construction); Electric Appliance Co. v. United States
F. & G. Co., 1io Wis. 434,438, 85 N.W. 648, 649 (i9oi); and see United States, to use of Zambetti, v. American Fence Const. Co., 15 F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A. 2d 1926).
A fortiori, no action will lie in favor of the materialman against the surety in the federa
courts under favor of 33 Stat. 81i, c. 778 (i9o5); 40 U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928). United States, to
use of Zambetti, v. American Fence Coast. Co., supra.
It is to be observed, however, that in case of mutual mistake in expression, not only the
owner, but probably the materialman, may have equitable relief by way of reformation. Faurote v. State, rio Ind. 463, 466, ii N.E. 472, 474 (1887), as explained in Hart v. State, 120
Ind. 83, 84, 87, 21 N.E. 654, 655, 24 id. isi (1889).
17
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Moreover, the addition of a condition that the work shall be completed
and delivered free from liens of persons furnishing labor or materials, or
that the owner be saved harmless from the liens or other claims of such
persons, should not affect the interpretation of the agreement to furnish
labor and materials, whether such liens could be acquired, as in cases of
private ownership, or could not be acquired, as in cases of public ownership and use.' 9 While the agreement to furnish labor and materials cannot
here be reasonably referred to the indemnification of the owner against
claims therefor, still it need not be interpreted as vesting rights in the
materialman; it may better be ascribed to a desire on the part of the
owner to exclude the contractor from claiming compensation in addition
to the contract price. It is also to be observed, as discussed in a later subtopic,2° that a provision to save the owner harmless from liens may be
met, not necessarily by paying the materialman or by procuring a release
from him, but by putting the owner in sufficient funds to pay him; moreover, the form of the condition imports an intention to protect and vest
rights in the owner rather than in the materialman.
Even more clearly, it makes no difference that the additional stipulation is to the effect that a present or retained percentage of estimates
should be payable by the owner to the contractor only if there be no liens
on the property and/or receipts of payment or other evidence of that fact
be produced.21
In the Michigan case of Alpena, for use of Zess, v. Title Guaranty &
Surety Co.,2 the contract required the principal to furnish labor and materials at his own expense, and the surety bond was conditioned on his performance of the contract and also on his saving the city and its officers
harmless from all claims for labor and materials. A materialman was held
19Townsend v. Cleveland Fire Proofing Co., 18 imd. App. 568, 575,47 N.E. 707, 709 (897);
Staples-Hildebrand Co. v. Metal Concrete Chimney Co., 62 Ind. App. 592, 112 N.E. 832
(i916); McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708, 90 S.E. ioi (igi6); Smith v.
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 45, 88 Pac. 687, 691 (1907) (individual sureties).
Contra: La Crosse Lumber Co. v. Schwartz, 163 Mo. App. 659, 147 S.W. 501 (I912) (also
omission on part of public officers to comply with statutory duty to take bond conditioned on
payment of persons furnishing labor or materials; individual sureties; court reasoned that
otherwise condition to save harmless would be meaningless).
Moreover, when the materialman has no claim against the owner or on his property, there
is no color for "subrogating" or otherwise equitably entitling the materialman to the right of
the owner against the surety for exoneration. Townsend v. Cleveland Fire Proofing Co., supra.
2oInfra, sub-topic IH-C.
21Staples-Hildebrand Co. v. Metal Concrete Chimney Co., 62 Ind. App. 592, 112 N.E. 832
(gi6); McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 7o8, 9o S.E. ioio (gi6); Montgomery v. Rief, 15 Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 (I897).

158 Mich. 678, 123 N.W. 536 (igog).
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to have a right against the surety. The writer doubts the soundness of the
decision; he submits that the materialman had merely a right against the
public officers for their failure to require a bond in proper form, and the
latter a right of recourse against the surety. The agreement to furnish
materials fell short of importing a right in the materialman, and the condition in the bond saving the officers harmless was intended only for their
protection and might have been fulfilled by principal or surety without
paying the materialman, for example, by putting the officers in funds for
that purpose or by procuring the materialman to release them. Likewise,
the writer is forced to disagree with the California case of Sunset Lumber
Co. v. Smith,23 a case of private construction, in which the bond was conditioned on performance of a contract requiring the contractor to furnish
necessary labor and materials and complete the work free from all liens.
He believes that an intention to create a right in the materialman against
the surety was not sufficiently manifested, in spite of the provision of a
California statute 4 that the filing of a bond so protecting materialmen
would restrict the lien on the owner's property to the amount due from
him to the contractor.
C. BONDS CONDITIONED, DIRECTLY OR BY REFERENCE TO THE CONTRACT, AGAINST
LIENS ON TH PROPERTY OF
OWNER OR FOR HIS INDEMNIFICATION

If the condition is that the principal shall complete and deliver the work
free from liens for labor or materials, the obvious purpose is the protection
of the owner and the intention is that he, and he alone, shall have rights.
Hence, if the owner pays a person who has furnished labor or materials
and thus removes a perfected lien on his property, he may recover his loss
so caused in an action on the surety bond. If, however, the time for filing
or otherwise perfecting the lien has expired, a payment by the owner cannot be recovered in an action on the bond, for it is voluntary and not the
proximate consequence of the principal's default.25 Moreover, if the lien
has not been perfected, so that it is as yet non-existing or inchoate, even
though the time for perfecting it has not expired, the payment should not
be recoverable in an action on the bond;26 it should be regarded as volun23 91

Cal. App. 746, 267 Pac. 738

(1928).

24 Cal.

Code of Civ. Proc. § 1183 (1931).

Fuqua v. Tulsa Masonic Bldg. Ass'n, 129 Okla. io6, 263 Pac. 66o (1928), Campbell's
Cases on Suretyship 19 (I931).
2s

Bell v. Paul, 35 Neb. 240, 52 N.W. iiIo (1892).
Contra: Fuqua v. Tulsa Masonic Bldg. Ass'n, 129 Okla. io6,

110, 263 Pac. 66o, 663 (1928)
(dictum that it is sufficient if lien is existing or impending).
In Simonson v. Grant, 36 Minn. 439, 31 N.W. 861 (1887), it was not held that a payment
made by the owner to the materialman before lien filed could not be recovered from the surety,
but only that, there being no such amount then due from the owner to the contractor, the payment was such an unjustifiable variation of the risk of the surety as to discharge him from responsibility for future payments.
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tary since the owner was not under risk of imminent loss and the principal
might have paid the materialman. Nevertheless, it must be observed
that, if the bond is also conditioned on the payment of persons furnishing
labor or materials, a payment made by the owner to such person before
lien filed, while not caused, is not officious and therefore in equity justifies
the subrogation of the owner, as a non-officious payor, to the claim of such
person against the surety on the bond, 7 or quasi-contractual recovery at
law against him on the ground of benefit conferred by the discharge of his
obligation.
On the other hand, when the bond is merely conditioned on completion
and delivery of the work free from liens, the person furnishing labor or
materials, although not paid therefor, usually cannot recover judgment on
the surety bond. This conclusion is clear (i) when a statute gives to such
person a lien on the property of the owner2S (as is frequently the case when
the work is of a private nature), for the condition is then obviously referable to the protection of the owner alone;29 and (2) even when no lien on
his property is possible, for example, when it is of public ownership and
use, 30 because the language shows that the attention of the parties is
directed to protection of the public owner, and the presence of the provision is properly attributable to misapprehension or abundant caution.
It is to be expected, however, that circumstances may point so strongly
the other way as to make the question of interpretation a close one. Thus,
27Yawkey-Crowley Lumber Co. v. Sinaiko, i8g Wis. 298, 303, 206 N.W. 976, 978 (1926).
28Fleming v. Greener, 173 Ind. 260, 266, 268, go N.E. 72, 73, 76, i4o Am. St. Rep. 254, 258,
21 Ann. Cas. 959, 961, modifying 87 N.E. 719, 721 (igog); Stetson & Post Mill Co. v. McDonald, 5 Wash. 496, 32 Pac. xo8 (1893) (although the surety did not execute any bond, he
signed contract as such). See Uhrich v. Globe Sur. Co., ii Mo. App. ii, i66 S.W. 845 (I915).
9A fortiori is this true, if the bond provides that the surety shall not be liable to anyone
except the owner (Herpolsheimer v. Hansell-Elcock Co., 141 Mich. 367, 369, 1o4 N.W. 671,
672 (igoS); Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 165 N.C. 285, 8r S.E. 418 (1914), Ann. Cas.
igi6A 763), or that the use or benefit of the bond, or right of action thereon, shall not accrue to
anyone except the owner (Crum v. Jenkins, 145 S.C. 177, 143 S.E. 21 (1928)).
Bonds Given by Owner to Mortgagee. Likewise, if the owner gives to a mortgagee a bond with
surety conditioned on completion of construction free from liens for labor or materials, a laborer
or materialman has no rights thereon. Cleveland Window Glass & Door Co. v. National Sur.
Co., 118 Ohio St. 414, 161 N.E. 28o (1928) (bond also conditioned on saving mortgagee harmless from such liens; mortgage superior to any lien); National Sur. Co. v. Brown-Graves Co.,
7 F. (2d) gi (C.C.A. 6th 1925) (same).
30 Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Independent School Dist., 121 Iowa 663, 97 N.W. 72 (1903)
(ib., 90 N.W. 5o4); McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708, 90 S.E. 1oo (igi6)
(even though a statute required the taking of a bond conditioned on payment for labor and

materials); Electric Appliance Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 11o Wis. 434, 85 N.W. 648,
53 L.R.A. 6og (rgoi) (even though contract called for a bond conditioned on payment for
labor or materials, and the condition was omitted).
All the more clearly is this true, if the bond provides that the surety shall not be liable, nor
its benefit accrue, to anyone other than the owner. In re Fowble, 213 Fed. 676 (D.C. Md. 1914).
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in La Crosse Lumber Co. v. Schwartz,3 the bond was also conditioned on
the contractor's furnishing materials, and it was the statutory duty of the
public officers to insert a condition for the payment of persons furnishing
labor or materials; it was held that an individual surety was liable to a
materialman32 on the reasoning that otherwise the condition for delivery
free from liens would be meaningless and the officers remiss in performance

of duty. Nevertheless, in such a case liability to the materialman would
be excluded by a provision in the bond that the surety should not be liable
to anyone except the owner, or that the use or benefit of the bond or the
right of action thereon should not accrue to any person other than the
33
owner.

Likewise, rights are denied to persons furnishing labor or materials
when the bond is directly or by reference conditioned on "saving the owner harmless"'34 or "exonerating" him from, or "reimbursing" him for,35 the
payment of such liens or claims. The reasons for such denial are stronger
here than in the situations last considered. A condition to deliver construction free from liens can be met, if liens have arisen, only by paying
the lienors or by procuring releases from them (in return for which they
may exact payment). On the other hand, a condition to exonerate, or to
save harmless (which properly includes exoneration), can be met alternatively by putting the owner in sufficient funds to make payment; and a
condition to reimburse necessarily contemplates performance to the
owner. A fortiori,a person furnishing labor or materials will have no right
on the bond when the contract to which it refers merely stipulates that the
31163 Mo. App. 659, 147 S.W.

501

(1912).

'2 Contra: McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708, 90 S.E. ioo (igi6) (although bond also contained a condition that owner be saved harmless from such claims). And
see Wilson v. Nelson, 54 Okla. 457, 153 Pac. 1179 (i16) ("indemnify and save harmless").
33Wallace Equipment Co. v. Graves, 132 Wash. X41, 144, 231 Pac. 458, 460 (T924).
'4 Pine Bluff Lodge v. Sanders, 86 Ark. 291, 298, 1ir S.W. 255, 257 (rgo8); Skinner Bros.
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Shevlin Eng. Co., Inc., 231 App. Div. 656, 659, 248 N.Y.S. 380, 383 (193i);
McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708, go S.E. xoio (Igr6); Wilson v. Nelson,
54 Okla. 457, z53 Pac. 1179 (Ig6); Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 427 (1915).
And see Dunlap v. Eden, 15 Ind. App. 575, 4 4 N.E. 560 (1896) (sub-contractor's bond conditioned on saving contractor harmless from liens; public construction; see note 86, infra).
A fortioriis this result to be reached when the bond provides that the surety shall be liable
to, or the use or benefit of the bond or the right of action thereon accrue to, no one save the
owner. Yet even then the materialman may recover judgment against the surety, if a statute
not only requires the execution of a bond conditioned for the protection of persons furnishing
labor or materials but also provides that a bond in which such condition is omitted shall have
the same legal effect as if it were included. Union Ind. Co. v. Acme Blow Pipe Works, i5o
Miss. 332, 349, 117 So. 251, 253 (1928).
"Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Independent School Dist., 121 Iowa 663,97 N.W. 72 (1903).
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retained percentage shall be payable by owner to contractor only if there
be no liens on the property, and/or a receipt of payment or other evidence
thereof be produced.36
Indeed, in two cases a materialman has been denied recovery from the
surety when the bond was conditioned on the contractor's paying any lien
for labor or materials as well as on his freeing the owner's property therefrom: (i) The Minnesota case of Moore v. Mann37 was one of private construction and the owner's property was exposed to such liens. The writer
submits that the provision for paying the lien might well have been
ascribed to an intention to vest a right to receive payment in the lienor,
and the provision for freeing the owner's property from the lien to an intention to place in the latter a right to require such payment.3 (2) In the
Illinois decision of Spalding Lumber Co. v. Brown,39 in which the owner
was a public school district, the statute imposed a lien not on the building
but on the fund, that is, on the balance due from the owner to the contractor, and hence on property of the latter. If the parties inserted the
provision for discharging the owner's property from liens under misapprehension, the question of interpretation was like that considered in connection with the Minnesota case; and if out of abundant caution, the provision for payment had to be accounted for, and it rather clearly imported
an intention to create rights in the materialman, since he needed the responsibility of the surety, inasmuch as the lien on the fund might (and
actually did) turn out to be insufficient. The writer's position, that the
surety is bound to the materialman on such a bond, is all the stronger if a
statute requires it to be conditioned on payment of claims for labor or
materials.
Cases have arisen in which the contract calls for a surety bond conditioned on the payment of persons furnishing labor or materials, but the
bond executed is conditioned only against liens on the property of the
owner or for his indemnification generally. In such cases, if the bond is not
also conditioned on performance of the contract, the requirement of the
contract is not sufficiently significant to lead to an interpretation of the
bond favoring materialmen;40 and so, even when the bond is conditioned
36Montgomery v. Rief, i5 Utah 495, 5o Pac. 623 (1897). Sub-topic II-F.
37 130 Minn. 318, r53 N.W. 6og (1915) (surety company held not liable to materialman).
38See Getchell & Martin Lumber Co. v. Peterson & Sampson, 124 Iowa 599, xoo N.W. 550
(i9o4) ("pay all claims for labor and material, and save owner harmless from any liens therefor"; judgment for materialman against surety company affirmed).
39 171 Ill.
487, 49 N.E. 725 (1898) (individual sureties held not liable to materialman). AcApp. 339 (1917).
cord: City of Herrin v. Stein, 206 Ill.
40 Wallace Equipment Co. v. Graves, 132 Wash. 141, 231 Pac. 458 (1924) (also, use of bond

confined to owner).
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on performance of all the provisions of the contract; nor in the latter case
could a iaterialman recover damages for failure to give the bond required by the contract, since the owner by accepting a different bond dis4
charged the contractual undertaking. 1
D. BONDS CONDITIONED, DIRECTLY OR BY REFERENCE TO THE CONTRACT, ON

PAYING CLAIMS FOR LABOR OR MATERIALS, AND ALSO ON
PROTECTING THE OWNER AGAINST LIENS THEREFOR

The question presented by such a bond is whether the presumption or
inference arising from the condition to pay claims for labor or materials is
rebutted by the presence of the condition protecting the owner against
such claims, for example, a condition that the work be completed and
delivered free from liens, or that the owner be saved harmless or exonerated therefrom or reimbursed for loss suffered thereby. There are three
lines of decision:
(I) Some authorities hold that materialmen 42 have no direct rights on
the bond, it being said either that the manifested purpose of the bond is
confined to protecting the owner and its intention to placing rights in
him, 4 or that if there is an intention to create rights in materialmen legal
effect will not be given to it. 44 Even so, if the owner's property is subject

to lien, as it usually is in a case of private construction, the materialmen
may well be held equitably entitled to the right of the owner against the
surety that the latter pay the materialmen,45 although the rule of Law41See sub-topic 11-B, note i8.
42The statements made in this sub-topic are equally applicable to persons furnishing labor;
and, if the coverage of the bond be wide enough, to supply and other creditors.
4SMaryland Cas. Co. v. Johnson, is F. (2d) 253 (D.C. Mich. 1926) (also stressing no reliance); Moore v. Mann, i3o Minn. 318, 153 N.W. 6og (i915) (surety company); Pankey v.
National Sur. Co., Is Ore. 648, 239 Pac. 8o8 (1925) and cases there cited; National Bank of
Cleburne v. Gulf etc. Ry. Co., 95 Tex. 176,66 S.W. 203 (1902); Oak Cliff Lumber Co. v. American Ind. Co., 266 S.W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Forsyth v. New York Ind. Co., i59 Wash.
318, 293 Pac. 284 (I930) and cases there cited.
44Central Supply Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 273 Mass. 139, 145, 173 N.E. 697, 699
(193o); Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn. 446, 55 N.W. 604, 25 L.R.A. 257, 39 Am. St. Rep. 618

(1893) (bond given "for the use" of materialmen).
45 It is to be observed that the owner is a real surety for the contractor. The fact that one is
a real rather than a personal surety does not prevent the creditor from being equitably entitled
to his interest in a security res proceeding from the principal (Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Trimble, 51 Md. 99, 113 (1878); and see Van Orden v. Durham, 35 Cal. 136 (r868), and Sherrod v. Dixon, 12o N.C. 60, 26 S.E. 770 (1897)). Nor should it prevent the creditor from being
entitled to the obligation of a stranger (here the surety) especially when, as here, that obligation
is to pay the creditor (Curtis v. Tyler, 9 Paige (N.Y.) 431 (1842), Campbell's Cases on Suretyship
233-234 (i93i)). It is true that the materialman, not being a creditor of the owner personally,

could not seize this asset by way of equitable execution. Nevertheless, ours is a case of a peculiar asset-peculiar in that performance necessarily comes to the materialman. See also the
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rence v. Fox46 probably cannot be so extended as to give a direct legal right
against the surety.
(2) Other authorities, especially the more recent ones, hold that the
materialmen have direct rights against the surety on the bond. This is the
sound conclusion, for, if the condition for the payment of materialmen
were intended to give protection to and place a right in the owner alone,
the condition protecting him against liens would be entirely redundant.
This conclusion becomes almost irresistible when a statute requires the
bond to include a condition for the payment of materialmen, or if it requires that it be thus drawn in order to avoid a lien on the property of the
owner. Nor does it make any difference whether the owner's property
could 47 or could not be subjected to liens. 45 In the former situation each
of the two conditions is thus assigned a distinct use; in the latter the condition against liens should be ascribed to misapprehension or abundant
treatment of an analogous situation in sub-topic I-D, note io6, in Part I of this article, published
in 3 Univ. Chli. L. Rev. i (i935). Of course, if the materialman has no claim against the owner
or on his property, even the indirect method of reaching the surety fails.
462o N.Y. 268 (1859).
47 Wm. Bayley Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., so F. (2d) 899 (C.C.A. 5th 193i); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 22o Ala. 262, 265, 125 So. 55, 57 (1929), 77 A.L.R. 13, i8; Mansfield Lumber Co. v. National Sur. Co., 176 Ark. 1035, 5 S.W. (2d) 294 (1928); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Big Rock Stone Co., i8o Ark. 1, 20 S.W. (2d) 18o (1929) (as it turned out, the materialman
failed to file lien seasonably; and see Morris v. Nowlin Lumber Co., ioo Ark. 253, 268, i4o
Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, io9 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293 (1929);
S.W. i, 6 (ii));
American Sur. Co. v. Smith, ioo Fla. 1012, 130 So. 44o (1930); Johnson Elec. Co., Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., ioi Fla. i86, 133 So. 850 (i931); Knight & Jillson Co. v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97,
87 N.E. 976 (1909), 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 573 (dictum); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 239 Ky. 247, 39 S.W. (2d) 234 (193) (materialman filed lien but it was discharged under the statute by the owner's giving another bond with sureties); Dixon & Wright
v. Home, i8o N.C. 585, xo5 S.E. 270 (1920) (bond conditioned that principal "satisfy all claims
and demands" and indemnify the owner for loss suffered by failure so to do); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 193 N.C. 769, 138 S.E. 143 (1927), ib., i97 N.C. 10, 147
S.E. 68i (1929); Warren Webster & Co. v. Beaumont Hotel Co., i51 Wis. 1, 138 N.W. 102
(1912) (bond conditioned on principal's paying "all indebtedness"); Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Sur. Co., 163 Wis. 41, 157 N.W. 543 (i916) (bond conditioned on principal's satisfying
"all claims and demands").
So, when the bond referred to the contract, which required the contractor to pay all persons
furnishing labor or materials and made final payment of the contract price conditional on the
discharge of all liens on the property and production of receipts therefor. Algonite Stone Mfg.
Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., xoo Kan. 28, 163 Pac. 1076 (i917), L.R.A. 19 17D 722.
48 Leslie Lumber & Supply Co. v. Lawrence, 178 Ark. 573, 11 S.W. (2d) 458 (1928); French
v. Farmer, 178 Cal. 218, 172 Pac. 1102 (1918) (work being done for railway company on land
of United States government); Baker & Co. v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561, 21 N.W. 83 (1884); Hartford Acc. & id. Co. v. W. & J. Knox Co., 15o Md. 40,48, 132 Ad. 261, 263 (1926) (mechanic's
lien on private property not obtainable in Baltimore); H. H. Robertson Co. v. Globe Ind. Co.,
268 Pa. 3o9, 112 Ad. 5o (1920) (statute so required).
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caution. Since this is a question of interpretation, it obviously makes no
difference whether or not a lien was ultimately perfected. It is to be observed that the form of bond adopted by the American Institute of Architects falls within this class, 49 and when a bond in that form is involved in
litigation the further reason may be adduced that courts should impute to
the parties the apparent intention of the Institute to extend protection not
alone to the owner but to persons furnishing labor or materials.5 Consequently, by the weight of authority, the materialman is recognized as having a direct right on the bond.5'
(3) There is authority for an intermediate view that the bond is to be
interpreted as conditioned on the payment of such claims for labor and
materials as shall become effective lienss2
In situations where the materiaman has a lien on the property of the
owner and also a right on the bond against the surety, the owner is a real
surety, and the surety a personal surety, for the contractor to the materialman; and they are in the consensual relation of subsurety and surety,
respectively, since such is the effect of the condition in the bond to save
the owner harmless from, or reimburse him for, payment of the claim of
the materialman; the result is that the owner is entitled to the usual
rights of recourse, that is, reimbursement, subrogation and exoneration,
against the surety as well as against the contractor.
49The condition of this form of bond is as follows: "Now, Therefore, the Condition of this
Obligation is such that if the Principal shall faithfully perform the Contract on his part, and
satisfy all claims and demands, incurred for the same, and shall fully indemnify and save
harmless the Owner from all cost and damage which he may suffer by reason of failure so to do,
and shall fully reimburse and repay the Owner all outlay and expense which the Owner may
incur in making good any such default, and shall pay all persons who have contracts directly
with the Principal for labor or materials, then this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise
it shall remain in full force and effect." Blake, Law of Architecture and Building 317 (2d ed.
1925).

so Bouldin, J., in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 22o Ala. 262, 266, i25 So. 55, 59, 77
A.L.R. i3, 19 (1929); Maltbie, J., in Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, iog Conn. 256,
266, 146 At. 293, 296 (1929).
s Win. Bayley Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 5o F. (2d) 899 (C.C.A. 5 th 193); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 22o Ala. 262, 265, 125 So. 55, 57, 77 A.L.R. 13, 18 (1929); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. National Sur. Co., 176 Ark. 1035, 5 S.W. (2d) 294 (1928); Byram Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Page, io9 Conn. 256, 146 Ati. 293 (1929); Johnson Elec. Co., Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co.,
ioi Fla. i86, 133 So. 85o (1931); Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. W. & 3. Knox Co., iso Md. 40,
132 Atl. 26x (1926); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 193 NC. 769, 138
S.E. 143 (1927); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Hotel Corp., 197 N.C. xo, 147 S.E. 68I, 198
N.C. 166, i5o S.E. 877 (1929).
Contra: Central Supply Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 273 Mass. 139, 173 N.E. 697
(1930); Forsyth v. New York Ind. Co., x59 Wash. 318, 324, 293 Pac. 284, 286 (1930) (on the
ground of absence of privity of contract, and distinguishing bonds for public construction).
52 Marquette Bldg. Co. v. Wilson, 1o9 Mich. 223, 67 N.W. 123 (i896) (materialman failed
seasonably to perfect lien on private property).
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E. BONDS CONDITIONED, DIRECTLY OR BY REFERENCE TO THE CONTRACT, ON
PAYMENT OF THE CLAIS OF PERSONS HAVING LIENS FOR LABOR
OR MATERIALS OR STATED TO BE FOR THEIR USE

If the bond is so worded, it is generally not intended that persons
furnishing labor or materials without acquiring liens on the property
should have rights on the bond, whether there is a statute which permits
the filing of liens, as when the promisee is a private owner, 3 or no such
statute, as when the property is of public ownership and use.54
When the property is of public ownership and use, the condition must
be ascribed to misapprehension or abundant caution. Even so, if the bond
is conditioned generally, that is, for the payment of all indebtedness of the
contractor, or the claims of all persons furnishing labor or materials, but is
stated to be for the benefit of persons having liens on the property of the
owner for labor and materials furnished, it has been held that the inference or presumption (arising from the condition) that all persons having
claims, or claims for furnishing labor or materials, as the case may be, are
intended to have rights on the bond, is not rebutted by the expression of a
qualified class of beneficiaries, since no one can meet the qualification.55
Furthermore, the existence of a statute requiring a bond conditioned on
the payment of all claims for labor or materials is an additional circum6
stance lending support to that interpretation.
If the bond is conditioned on the payment of anyone "who, in the absence of the bond, would have a lien" on the fund, steps for the perfection
and preservation of such a lien need not be taken, since by force of statute
57
the execution of the bond excludes an enforceable lien.
Lastly, suppose that the property is of private ownership and that a
person furnishing labor or materials has acquired a lien thereon. By the
very condition of the bond such a person is to receive payment, but is he
intended to have a right to payment? For the negative, it may be argued
that usually he is fully protected by the lien and hence not in need of a
"3The writer has not found supporting authority.
S4Hutchinson v. Krueger, 34 Okla. 23, 124 Pac. 59i (1912), 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 3x5, Ann. Cas.
19 14C 98.

"Snider v. Greer-Wilkinson Lumber Co., 51 Ind. App. 348,96 N.E. 96o (1912) (public construction; bond conditioned on payment of all indebtedness; but expressed to run to and be for
the use and suit of persons acquiring liens; individual sureties).
Contra: Smith v. Bowman, 32 Utah 33,88 Pac. 687 (1907), 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 889 (like facts).
s6Klein v. Beers, 95 Okla. 80, 218 Pac. 1087 (1923) (other facts like those in Snider v.
Greer-Wilkinson Lumber Co., supra note 55).
s"Guard Rail Erectors, Inc. v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 349, i68 Ati. 903 (i933)
(involving N.H. Laws 1927, c. 88, §§ i, 2). And see American Bridge Co. v. United States
F. & G. Co., 174 AtI. 57 (N.H. 1934), in which one furnishing material to a sub-contractor was
allowed to recover on the bond.
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right on the bond; and also that, if the owner had an interest in the protection of laborers and materialmen, he would naturally have included
those without liens as well as those with liens. It seems to be the better
view, however, that the usual inference or presumption of intention to
create rights in the person who is to receive payment is not rebutted; it
will be to the advantage of the owner for the lienor to have a right against
the surety which he can and probably will enforce in exoneration of the
property of the owner.
F. BONDS CONDITIONED ON PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE
OWNER'S WITBHOLDING OF T
CONTRACT PRICE UNTIE, CLAMS FOR
LABOR OR MATERIALS BE PAID OR RECEIPTS BE PRODUCED

If the contract makes payment of the contract price or any part
thereof (for example, payable or retained percentages of estimates) conditional, either absolutely or at the election of the owner, on the contractor's
paying persons having claims for labor or materials, or otherwise provides
in effect that the owner shall or may withhold the price until such persons
be paid, the latter do not thereby obtain rights on the surety bond,
whether the property, being of private ownership, is subject to liens for
such claims,18 or, being of public ownerwhip and use, is not so subject.5 9
(2) Likewise, if the contract makes such payment conditional, either
absolutely or at the election of the owner, 6o on the contractor's producing
releases, receipts for payment, or other evidence of satisfaction, of claims
(I)

58Uhrich v. Globe Sur. Co., igi Mo. App. iii, 66 S.W. 845 (i915) (right to withhold purchase price until liens satisfied; agreement in contract to pay for all labor and material in same
sentence with the agreement to build and regarded by court as importing intention only to
protect owner). See Lauer v. Dunn, iI5 N.Y. 405, 409, 22 N.E. 270, 271 (889) (arguendo;lien
only on fund), and Hurd v. Johnson Park Inv. Co., 13 Misc. 643, 34 N.Y.S. 915 (I895) (arguendo; lien only on fund).
Contra: Cooke v. Luscombe, 132 Kan. 147, 294 Pac. 849 (193).
59Hunter v. Boston, 218 Mass. 535, 1o6 N.E. 145 (1914) (contract provided that city
"shall deduct and retain" from monthly estimates sums required to settle claims for labor or
materials); McCausland & Co. v. Brown Const. Co., 172 N.C. 708, 9 o S.E. ioo (x916) (bond
conditioned on turning building over free from liens and saving city harmless; contract provided that city might retain out of price an amount sufficient for its indemnity); Montgomery v.
Rief, 15 Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 (x897) (retained percentage to be payable only if there be no
liens for labor or materials and on the contractor's producing payrolls, receipts or releases that
all labor and materials have been fully paid for); Electric Appliance Co. v. United States F. &
G. Co., I1o Wis. 434, 85 N.W. 648 (1goI), 53 L.R.A. 6og (contract provided that work should
be delivered free from liens and that before final payment the contractor should produce receipts for labor and materials).
Contra: Korsmeyer Plumbing & Heating Co. v. McClay, 43 Neb. 649, 65o, 62 N.W. 50, 51
(1895); Des Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Marxen, 87 Neb. 684, 128 N.W. 31 (19io); Northwestern Bridge & Iron Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 171 Wis. 526, 177 N.W. 3x (1920) (not only

was subcontractor awarded the amount due from city to contractor but also given judgment
against the surety company for the balance of his claim).
6oBaltimore v. Maryland Cas. Co., 146 Md. SoS, 126 Atl. 88o (1924).
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for labor or materials, persons having such claims have no rights on the
surety bond, whether the property be of private ownership,6' or of public
ownership and use.62
These are sound interpretations. In cases of private ownership the provision of the contract, whether of the type treated in the first paragraph
or in the second, is obviously intended for the security of the owner
against such liens. 63 In cases of public ownership and use either type of
provision is properly attributable to misapprehension or abundant caution on the part of the owner rather than to an intention to place rights in
persons furnishing labor or materials; or else to an intention (especially
when withholding of payment is made dependent on the election of the
owner) to create in such persons liens on the fund, that is, on the right of
the contractor against the owner to receive the contract price-an intention
which stops far short of vesting rights in them on the surety bond.64
It is to be observed, however, in cases falling under either paragraph
(i) or (2) of this sub-topic, that if the bond, directly or by reference to the
contract, is also conditioned on the payment of persons having claims for
labor or materials, such persons have rights on the surety bond, whether
the owner's property may61 or may not be6" subjected to lien.
61Contra: Cooke v. Luscombe, 132 Kan. 147, 294 Pac. 849 (1931) ("furnish all labor and
materials necessary .... ; balance payable after receipts are furnished showing all labor and
material is paid for"; improperly rested on Algonite Stone Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
zoo Kan. 28, 163 Pac. 1076 (1917), L.R.A. 19 17D, 722).
6
2 Staples-Hildebrand Co. v. Metal Concrete Chimney Co., 62 Ind. App.- 592, 112 N.E. 832
(i916); Hunt v. King, 97 Iowa 88, 9 o , 66 N.W. 71, 72 (1896) (statute gave mechanics' liens on
building in public ownership and use); Ludowici-Celadon Co. v. Netcott, 186 Iowa 730, 732,
172 N.W. 943 (i919) (accelerated payment of contract price on production of receipts); Carr &
Baal Co. v. Consolidated Dist., 187 Iowa 930, 174 N.W. 780 (1919); Baltimore v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 146 Md. 5o8, 126 AtU. 88o (1924).

Contra: Lyman v. City of Lincoln, 38 Neb. 794, 57 N.W. 531 (1894) (individual surety);
Des Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Marxen, 87 Neb. 684, 128 N.W. 31 (1910).
63So, in case of public ownership and use, if a statute gives liens on the property. Hunt v.
King, 97 Iowa 88, go, 66 N.W. 71, 72 (I896).
64 Baltimore v. Maryland Cas. Co., 146 Md. 5o8, 512, 126 AtU. 88o, 881 (1924); Hunter v.
Boston, 218 Mass. 535, io6 N.E. 145 (914) (city "shall deduct, and retain"). In Van Clief &
Sons, Inc. v. City of New York, 141 Misc. 216, 252 N.Y.S. 402 (193I), a statute gave liens on
the fund, so that the provision of the bond was obviously inserted merely by way of recognition
of the liens.
6
s Algonite Stone Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., ioo Kan. 28, 163 Pac. 1076 (i917),
L.R.A. i917D 722 ("furnish satisfactory evidence"); Warren Webster & Co. v. Beaumont
Hotel Co., 1s1 Wis. i, 138 N.W. 102 (1912) ("furnish written vouchers of payment or waiver of

lien").
Contra: American Sur. Co. v. Win. Cameron &Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
6 Brown v. Markland, 22 Ind. App. 652, 53 N.E. 295 (i899) ("neither shall there be any
claim against the contractor for labor or materials"; also certificate required from public officer
that there are no liens); National Sur. Co. v. Foster Lumber Co., 42 lad. App. 671, 85 N.E. 489
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III. DIFFICULTIES IN CONERRING PROTECTION ON PERSONS
FURNISHING LABOR OR MATERIALS

Certain serious, though not insurmountable, obstacles oppose the protection of such persons and require special treatment.
A. POSSIBLE OR EVENTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE OWNER
AND PERSONS FURNISHING LABOR OR MATERIALS

Most construction bonds are conditioned, either directly or by reference
to the contract, on performance of the work as well as on payment of
claims of persons furnishing labor or materials. Indeed, the cases cited in
this article usually involve bonds of this dual type. It is obvious that a
conflict of interest will arise if the claims of the public or private owner
and of persons furnishing labor or materials exceed in the aggregate the
limit of liability of the surety bond.
(I) This possible conflict of interest has a bearing on the interpretation
of the bond. If it is to be interpreted as giving to the owner a superior
right and to the materialman an inferior right, the arguments favoring an
intention to vest rights in the materialman would be as strong here as if
the condition for performance of the work were omitted, since the owner
could not be prejudiced. An interpretation tending to vest rights in the
materialman of equal rank with those of the owner, however, might
eventually place the materialman in competition with the owner to the
latter's prejudice, and some courts have thought this a sufficient reason
for denying to the materialman any right whatever on the bond.67 Nevertheless, most courts have soundly held that an intention to vest rights in
the materialman may be found even here, because the owner may, and usually does, exact a bond in an amount large enough to cover all defaults
68
which may reasonably be anticipated.
(igo8); Baker & Co. v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 56r, 21 N.W. 83 (884) ("produce receipts"); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N.M. 68, 251 Pac. 380, 49 A.L.R. 525 (1926),
Campbell's Cases on Suretyship 13 (i93i); R. Connor Co. v. Aetna Ind. Co., ,36 Wis. 13, 115
N.W. 8ix (I9O8) ("show that the property was free from all liens for work done or material
furnished").
6
7Sun Lid. Co. v. American University, 58 App. D. C. 184, 26 F. (2d) 556 (1928); Fosmire v.
National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472 (1920); City of Lancaster v. Frescoln, 192 Pa.
452, 43 At. 96I (i899), 203 Pa. 640, 53 AUt. 5o8 (1902); Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co.,
292 Pa. 304, 308, 141 AUt. 27, 29 (1927), approved as to this question in Concrete Products Co.
v. United States F. & G. Co., 3io Pa. 158, i65, i65 Atl. 492, 495 (i933); Patterson v. New
Eagle Borough, 294 Pa. 4oi, 405, I44 At. 423, 424 (1928); Pittsburgh v. Bucanelly Const. Co.,
3OO Pa. 27, i5o At. ioo (I93O). See sub-topic I-C, note 66, in Part I of this article, published

in 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (igS).
68Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala.

262,

267, 125 So. 55, 59 (1929), 77 A.L.R. 13,

20 (private construction); Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, xog Conn. 256, 266, 146 Atl.
293, 296 (1929) (private construction); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32
N.M. 68, P51 Pac. 38o (1926), 4 9 A.L.R. 525 (public construction), Campbell's Cases on Sure-
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(2) The bond being given the wider interpretation, the question arises
what disposition shall be made of the proceeds in the comparatively rare
event that they are insufficient to satisfy all the claims of owner and
materialmen. Clearly the surety is not liable in the aggregate for more
than the amount of the bond. 9 It is submitted that he may interplead the
various claimants, paying the amount of the bond into court; the fund will
then be distributed ratably among the claimants. Occasionally, statutes
regulate the disposition of the proceeds of the bond; 70 or the bond itself
may specify the disposition.7' In the absence of such specific disposition,
the owner and the persons furnishing labor or materials should be ratably
7
entitled to the proceeds of the bond. 2
B. EXPRESSED PAYEE OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE BOND A DIFFERENT
PERSON FROM PAYEE OF THE CONDITION

Most bonds considered in this article take the form of an agreement
binding principal and surety to pay to the owner 7 3 a certain sum of money,
tyship 13 (ig3i); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Earle-Lansdell Co., 142 Va. 435, 452, 129 S.E. 263,
130, id. 235 (1925) (public construction). Many authorities cited throughout this article sustain this conclusion although the objection of conflict of interest is not discussed.
There has also been a tendency to lay stress on the power of supervision which the owner
has over the work, but the writer considers this of little importance since it extends only to the
quality of the work but not to economy in the purchase or use of labor and materials.
69Pankey v. National Sur. Co., i15 Ore. 648, 654, 239 Pac. 8o8, 81O (1925) (alternative decision).
70 33 U.S. Stat. 8II, c. 778 (1905), 40 U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928), amending 28 Stat. 278, c. 280
(1894) (establishing a preference in favor of the United States and providing for the intervention of all persons furnishing labor or materials to obtain ratable distribution of the residue).
See United States v. Hampton Roads Corp., 72 F. (2d) 943 (C.C.A. 4 th 1934) (deciding what
constitutes "final settlement" with government); La. Acts of 1922, no. 139 (preference to persons furnishing labor or materials); Miss. Laws i98, c. 128, § 3 (priority given to owner; materialmen to share residue pro rata); Pa. L. 1921, 650, 653 (priority given to Commonwealth;
materialmen to intervene and share residue pro rata).
7zIn Commonwealth v. National Sur. Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Aft. 1034 (i916), the bond provided that every p erson having a claim for labor or materials might bring suit in the name of the
Commonwealth for his own use; that no suit should be a bar to other suits; that the aggregate
of the judgments therein should not exceed the penal sum of the bond, and that such judgments
should be paid in the order of the institution of suit, except that judgments on suits brought on
the same day should be paid ratably.
In Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 301 Pa. 132, zSi Aft. 687 (1930), the
bond provided that persons furnishing labor or materials might intervene in any suit brought
by the county, subject to the priority of any claim of the county, and that if the county did not
sue within six months then any such person might do so.
7The cases seem tacitly to assume such distribution, inasmuch as they indicate no different method. The question was left open, however, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Earle-Lansdell Co., 142 Va. 435, 453, 129 S.E.*263, 130, id. 235 (1925).
73If the bond provides that the principal and surety shall pay to the owner and al persons
furnishing labor or materials the amount of the bond if the work be not performed and such
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subject to a condition that the obligation shall be void if the principal pays
all persons having claims for labor or materials. Some cases hold that an
agreement to pay such persons is not to be implied7 4 Most cases, however, hold the contrary,7 5 and they represent the better view. To interpret
such a bond literally, as the former authorities do, makes it an agreement
for a penalty 76 which equity would not permit to be enforced. To interpret
the condition as importing an agreement to reimburse the owner with limitation of liability avoids that objection but falls short of fully effectuating
the contemplated protection of the persons furnishing labor or materials.
It is best, therefore, to attribute the form of the bond to the persistency of
ancient practice and to interpret the condition as importing an agreement
made with the owner to make payment to the persons furnishing labor or
materials, and the obligatory words as imposing a limitation on total
liability.77
C. EXTENT OF SURETY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR LABOR AND MATERIALS FURNISHED

The surety's undertaking is to pay for labor and materials furnished for
the doing of the work described in the bond or the contract to which it
refers. Even though the contractor may fail to perform the contract in the
manner stated therein, either with or without agreement between himself
and the owner, still the job may be substantially the same as that contracted for; in such a case the surety's liability extends to the labor and
materials furnished therefor."5 Nor will recovery be defeated by the mere
persons be not paid (or with a condition of defeasance on such performance and payment), no
difficulty is encountered. National Sur. Co. v. Hall-Miller Decorating Co., 104 Miss. 626, 61
So. 700 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325.
74 Standard Gas Power Corp. v. New England Cas. Co., go N.J.L. 570, ioi AtI. 281 (1917)
(court stressed fact that bond ran to public owner with penal sum payable to it; bond was conditioned on payment for labor and materials, and saving owner harmless from claims therefor);
Skllman v. United States F. & G. Co., ioi N.J.L. 511,

13o

AUt. 564 (1925) (like facts, except

that public owner was to be saved harmless from all suits and costs of every description).
7s Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 22o Ala. 262, 264, 266, 125 So. 55, 56, 58 (1929), 77
A.L.R. 13, i6, 19, and cases cited therein. Many other authorities are cited passim, and in 77

A.L.R.

21, 190 (1932).

76Professor Arthur L. Corbin, in an able article in 38 Yale L. J. i, 13 (1928) entitled "Third
Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds."
77Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 22o Ala. 262, 266, 125 So. 55, 58 (1929), 77 A.L.R. 13,
I9 (private construction); Bymm Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, io9 Conn. 256, 26i, 146 AUt.
293, 294 (1929) (private construction).
78 Chaffee v. United States F. & G. Co., 128 Fed. 918 (C.C.A. 8th i9o4) (without knowledge
of materialman); Otis Elev. Co. v. Long, 238 Mass. 257, 265, 130 N.E. 265, 268 (192I).

It is to be observed that the distinct right of a materiahman who does not participate in a
modifying arrangement between owner and contractor, is not discharged on any ground of
variation of risk, although the owner's right against the surety be discharged for that reason.
Sub-topic V-C.
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fact that the labor or materials were furnished after the time specified in
9
the contract for completion of the work.
If, however, the job has become a different job, either with or without
the consent of the owner, whether by change in its nature or by enlargement, 8° the surety is not responsible for labor or materials thereafter furnished, since they fall outside the coverage of the bond.
IV.

RIGHTS OF LABORERS AND MATERIALMEN ON BONDS GIVEN BY

PERSONS OTHER THAN THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACTOR
A. BY A SUBCONTRACTOR

In considering whether M-2, the person so furnishing labor or materials, has a right on the bond against S-2, the surety on the bond of P-2,
the subcontractor, two typical situations may be considered.
(i) In cases of the first type, P, the principal contractor, and S, his
surety, incur responsibility by virtue of bond or statute, or both, to M-2;
thus P becomes surety, and S subsurety, for P-2 to M-2. The bond given
by the subcontractor imposes liability on S-2 in favor of M-2 on ordinary
principles of third-person-beneficiary contracts."' It is not fatal that the
obligation of P, the principal contractor and new promisee, and of S-2,
the new promisor, 82 are conditional, that is, on nonpayment by P-2. Nor
is it necessary that M-2 knew of or relied on the bond.83 Moreover, it is
apparent that P is surety for P-2 and also for S-2, because of the terms of
the bond which he has taken from them, and hence S is surety not alone
for P but also for P-2 and S-2. The result is that P and S will each have
appropriate rights of recourse against every person for whom he is sure'Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., x49 Fed. 507, 5,I (C.C. Mo. i9o6) ; National
Sur. Co. v. Kansas City Brick Co., 73 Kan. i96, 210, 84 Pac. 1034, 1039 (r9o6).
so Commonwealth v. R. L. Bonham Co., 297 Pa. 514, 147 Atl. 6i1 (1929) (material raise in
grade of road, requiring one fourth more earth to be borrowed). And see Bullard v. Norton,
107 Tex. 571 , 58o, 182 S.W. 668, 671 (i916) (reasoning); United States, to use of Anniston
Pipe etc. Co. v. National Sur. Co., 92 Fed. 549, 552 (C.C.A. 8th 1899) (diclum).
8, American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Lee & Kincaid Coal Co., 226 Ala. 262, 264, 146 So. 408,

409 (I933) (bond running to surety who had taken over the work and sublet it to sub-contractor); Pacific States Elec. Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 1o9 Cal. App. 691, 293 Pac. 812
(1930) (private construction, see note 9, supra); Griffith v. Stucker, 91 Kan. 47, 136 Pac. 937
(193) (public construction); General Motors Truck Co. v. Phillips, 191 Minn. 467, 254 N.W.
S8o (934).
Cotra: Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Pacific Sur. Co., 86 Wash. 489, 15o Pac. 1054 (1915)
(on the ground of lack of privity).
All the more dearly is S-2 liable to M-2, if the bond he executed runs to the owner and contractor as promisees. Smith v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 280 S.W. 767 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926)

(public construction).
8

1Restatement, Contracts § 134

(1932).

83Griffith v. Stucker, 91 Kan. 47, 136 Pac. 937 (1913)-
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ty.8 4 Furthermore, in the alternative, it would seem that, to the extent
of any payment made by him to M-2, P will have an equitable defence to
payment of the subcontract price, which defence would be available not
only against P-2, but any assignee of his, for example, a financing bank.
This defence rests on the fact that the subcontract and the bond were
executed as parts of one transaction, and breach of the agreement contained in the bond, to pay materialmen, justifies reduction of the amount
8s
due under the contract.
Of course, if the condition of the subcontractor's bond is not to pay
persons furnishing labor or materials but to save the contractor harmless
from liens on the real estate, and no such liens are possible because the
real estate is of public ownership and use, then M-2 is not within the
terms of the bond and has no rights thereon against S-2.86
(2) In the second type of situation, the obligee in the bond of P-2, the
subcontractor (whether such obligee be P, the contractor, or S, his surety)
is not liable 7 to M-2 for the materials furnished by him to P-2. In such
case the first question is one of interpretation of the subcontractor's bond,
on which S-2 is surety, that is, whether it was intended that rights should
accrue thereon to materialmen, and the second whether the law should
give effect to such intention in favor of third-person-beneficiaries. While
the writer has found no case in point, he believes that both questions
should be answered in the affirmative, even as in the analogous case of a
construction bond given by a contractor to an owner who is under no
88
risk, real or personal, in respect to the payment of materialmen.
B. BY AN INDEMNITOR OR A RE-INSURER or
58

E S RTY

In Brown & Haywood Co. v. Ligon, a case of public construction, the
surety, who was bound by bond and statute to persons furnishing labor or
materials, took an indemnity bond conditioned on the contractor's paying
8

4Pacific States Elec. Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., iog Cal. App. 691, 695, 293 Pac. 812,
813 (1930) (dictum that S would be subrogated to the right of M-2 against S-2); Davis Co., Inc.
v. D'Lo Guaranty Bank, 162 Miss. 829, 138 So. 802 (1932) (P held entitled to indemnification
from P-2 and S-2 for the amount paid to M-2).
IsAmerican Bridge Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 174 Atl. 57, 58 (N.H. 1934) (Woodbury, J., arguendo);Davis Co., Inc. v. D'Lo Guaranty Bank, 162 Miss. 829, 138 So. 802 (1932)
(Smith, C. J., and Anderson, J., dissenting), in effect recognizes a statutory denial of this
defence.
86Dunlap v. Eden, i5Ind. App. 575, 44 N.E. 560 (1896).
87Such non-liability might well result from the fact that the coverage of P's bond is not
wide enough.
88See sub-topic I-C, in Part I of this article, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1935).
8992

Fed. 85I (C.C. Mo. 1899).
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the claims of such persons as well as on his saving the surety harmless
therefrom. In an action brought by a materialman against the indemnitor
judgment was properly given for the plaintiff. The materialman was a
creditor-beneficiary within the rule of Lawrence v. Fox;9° the surety had a
peculiar asset, peculiar in that performance would necessarily accrue to
persons furnishing labor or materials. If the indemnity contract had been
merely for the reimbursement or reinsurance 9' of the surety, dearly no
rule of contracts or suretyship would have availed the materialman. A
bond conditioned merely on "saving harmless" or "exonerating" the surety would probably be no more efficacious, since the indemnitor might
perform his obligation without paying the materialman, that is, by putting the surety in funds without imposing any restriction on their use.9
v.

LEGAL EFFECT OF COLLATERAL MATTERS

The rights of persons furnishing labor or materials may conceivably be
affected by various collateral matters, such as improper action or inaction
on the part of the owner or contractor, or transactions between them.
A. BONDS PROCURED BY FRADD OP. NON-DISCLOSURE

If the owner procures the surety to execute the bond by fraudulent
representation or concealment or through breach of a duty of disclosure
owed by him to the surety, the latter has a primafacieright to rescind his
obligation to the person furnishing labor or materials;93 so also, if the
principal procures the surety to sign the bond by like means. Nevertheless, this power of rescission will be terminated if, with knowledge of the
facts, the surety affirms the bond,94 or if the third person, without knowledge of the fraud or non-disclosure and in reliance on the terms of the
bond, furnishes labor or materials or otherwise suffers an irremediable
change or difference in position95
90 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); Restatement, Contracts §§ 133-147 (1932).
9' United States, to use of Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Sur. Co., 72 F. (2d) 964, 967
(C.C.A. 4th 1934).
92Hasbrouck v. Carr, i 9 N.M. 586, 594, 45 Pac. 133, 135 (1914) (bond to indemnify, save
harmless and place surety company in funds; surety company insolvent and dissolved).
93Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 193 N.C. 769, 138 S.E. 143 (1927);
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Hotel Corp., z98 N.C. i66, i5o S.E. 877 (1929) (same case). This
is the rule generally applicable to third-person-beneficiary contracts. i Williston, Contracts
§ 394 (1920); 4 Page, Contracts § 2393 (2d ed. 1920).
94 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Hotel Corp., 197 N.C. 10, 147 S.E. 681 (1929).
9s American Emp. Ins. Co. v. Lee & Kincaid Coal Co., 226 Ala. 262, 265, 146 So. 408, 420
(1933); Miss. F. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 153 Miss. 635, 644, 20 So. 738, 741 (1929) (non-disclosure);
Spokane & Idaho Lumber Co. v. Boyd, 28 Wash. 90, 68 Pac. 337 (1902) (non-disclosure of
principal's insanity; also fraudulent representation made by public owner to principal).
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It is to be observed that while ordinarily rescission for fraud requires a
return or tender of return of that which was received, a surety company
need not return or tender return of the premium to the principal or owner
until the question of rescission for fraudulent procurement of the bond is
adjudicated. The reason is that if the decision were unfavorable to it, the
surety company might be liable to the materialman and yet be deprived
of its premium96
B. STATUTORY INVALIDITY Or TIM CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

In California, a statute97 provided that a construction contract should
be recorded, and that otherwise it should be void and not enforceable at
the suit of either party thereto; that, if it was recorded, persons furnishing
labor or materials should have a lien on the property only to the extent of
the amount due from the owner to the contractor, but, if not recorded, for
the full amount of their claims. The Supreme Court of that state properly
decided that, in case the contract was not recorded, a private owner, who
had taken a surety bond conditioned on his being saved harmless from
liens on his property for labor or materials, could maintain an action on
the bond against the contractor 98 and his surety 99 for the amount paid to
remove a materialman's lien. The evident purpose of the legislature in
requiring the contract to be recorded was to give to persons furnishing labor or materials opportunity to discover the true relation between owner
and builder, and the provision as to voidness was to induce recording; to
hold the bond invalid as to principal or surety would have exceeded the
language of the statute and given to its purpose an unneeded sanction. A
different question arose under the same statute in Union Sheet Metal
Works v. Dodge,00 a case which involved public construction; the bond
made the surety responsible to persons furnishing labor or materials, and
the contract was not recorded. Assuming that the statute which voided
the contract for non-recording applied to public as well as private construction, the court nevertheless held that the voidness of the contract did
not exclude the materialman from rights on the surety bond. This is a
sound conclusion, for the language of the statute did not concern the bond
and the denial of rights to a materialman thereon would not directly induce the recording of the contract, which was between other parties.
Indeed, it seems to be generally held that statutory invalidity of the
96 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Hotel Corp., 198 N.C. i66, z5o S.E. 877 (1929).
97 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § i183 (1872).

98 Kiessig v. Allspaugh, 91 Cal. 234, 27 Pac. 662 (1891).
99Kiessig v. Allspaugh, 99 Cal. 452, 34 Pac. io6 (i893).
o
oo 129 Cal. 39 , 62 Pac. 41 (I9OO).
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contract between owner and contractor affords no defence to the surety as
against persons furnishing labor or materials."°" Such invalidity may arise

from exceeding a debt limit,"'' irregularity in the proceedings of a public
body or the fact that it does not own the land on which the improvement
is to be made,'0 3 failure to establish an official street grade,104 extending the
time of performance after the power of public body to do so has ceased, °S
the exclusion of competitive bidding, °6 or (it has been held) even the entire absence of power of the public body to enter into a contract of this
class.! 07

The question now arises whether knowledge of or participation in illegality (invalidating the contract) will prevent the person furnishing labor
or materials from recovering on the bond. In Kansas a company manufacturing paving brick procured the signatures of certain abutting owners
to street-paving petitions specifying the use of its brick, and the ordinances and contracts for the improvement accordingly contained similar
specifications. Such stifling of competitive bidding was involved as to
constitute a violation of statute and invalidate the contract between city
and contractor. Three questions arose as to the rights of materialmen:
(i) Were persons furnishing materials without knowledge of the facts constituting illegality to be given recovery on the surety bond? This question
was properly answered in the affirmative., °5 (2) Were persons furnishing
materials with knowledge of such facts to have recovery on the bond?
10' 77 A.L.R. 21, 192 (1932).
102Tulsa

Rig Real Co. v. Hansel, 69 Okla. i51, 170 Pac. 512 (i9x8).

103Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 113 N.W. 271 (19o7), 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 793, 12o Am.

St. Rep. 621.
104 Hub Hardware Co. v. Aetna Acc. & Liab. Co., 178 Cal. 264, 173 Pac. 8r (1918).
los Los Angeles Stone Co. v. National Sur. Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 Pac. 79 (1918).
6

Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 149 Fed. 507 (D.C. Mo. 19o6) (on demurrer); Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 167 Fed. 496 (C.C.A. 8th i9og) (on motion
for directed verdict); American Bonding Co. v. Dickey, 74 Kan. 791, 88 Pac. 66 (i9o6); National Sur. Co. v. Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co., 76 Kan. 914, 92 Pac. 111 (1907); Kansas
City, ex rel. Diamond Brick & Tile Co. v. Schroeder, z96 Mo. 281, 302,93 S.W. 405,409 (igo6).
107 Miss. F. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 153 Miss. 635, 643, 120 So. 738, 741 (1929). But see Bell v.
10

Kirldand, 102 Minn. 213, 222, 113 N.W. 271, 275 (1907) (dichum).
Metz v. Warrick, 217 Mo. App. 504, 269 S.W. 626 (1925) (contract not in writing), is not
contra, for there the bond was conditioned on completion of work and not on payment of persons furnishing labor or materials, so that the materialman was obliged to contend that his
right was a statutory consequence of a bond in that form.
log American Bonding Co. v. Dickey, 74 Kan. 791, 88 Pac. 66 (i9o6); National Sur. Co. v.

Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co., 76 Kan. 914,

92

Pac. xiii (19o7) (holding that the materialman

was not put on constructive notice of the terms of the contract).
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The Supreme Court of Kansas answered this question in the negative,o9
but the decisions of the federal courts allowing recovery seem to represent
the better view.Io (3) Shall a person who induced or participated in the
illegal conduct or transaction, or his assignee, obtain recovery on the
surety bond? Even here recovery was granted by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the illegal conduct of the plaintiff did not involve such turpitude as to vitiate the bond which was the
indirect result of the illegality."' It is to be observed, however, that
merely to invalidate the contract between contractor and city would at
most only affect the wrongdoer by preventing the sale of the brick, whereas to deny him rights on the bond for the unpaid price would be an additional and much more effective deterrent.
C. TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN OWNER AND PRINCIPAL, SUCH AS MODIFICATION
OF THE CONTRACT, SURRENDER OF SECURITY, AND PREMATURE PAYMAENT

While a new agreement between the owner and the contractor, extending the time for performance of or otherwise modifying the obligations of
their contract, may be such as to discharge the surety from responsibility
for the completion of the work on the ground of variation of risk, the distinct right of the person who furnished labor or materials is not affected
thereby,12 unless he was a contributive cause of the agreement of extension or modification.Y3 All the more is there reason for this conclusion if
19 National Sur. Co. v. Kansas City Brick Co., 73 Kan. I96, 84 Pac. 1034 (igo6); Atkin v.
Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co., 73 Kan. 768, 84 Pac. IO4o (igo6).
110Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 149 Fed. 507 (D.C. Mo. i9o6) (on demurrer); Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 167 Fed. 496 (C.C.A. 8th igog) (on motion
for directed verdict; reversing 157 Fed. 620 (1907)).
-" Kansas City Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 167 Fed. 496 (C.C.A. 8th i9og) (on motion
for directed verdict; reversing i57 Fed. 620 (1907); plaintiff took assignment of contract for
purchase and sale of brick between contractor and wrongdoer and furnished the brick with
knowledge of the wrong). Accord: Kansas City, ex rel. Diamond Brick & Tile Co. v. Schroeder,
196 Mo. 281, 302, 93 S.W. 405, 409 (i9o6) (one of the plaintiffs was the wrongdoer).
"eUnited States v. National Sur. Co., 92 Fed. 549, 551 (C.C.A. 8th 1899); Los Angeles
Stone Co. v. National Sur. Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 Pac. 79 (1918) (extension of time); Conn v.
The State, 125 Ind. 514, 519, 25 N.E. 443, 444 (i8go); Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co. v.
Texas Bldg. Co., 99 Kan. 567, 574, 162 Pac. 299, 302 (I9M7), L.R.A. 1917C 490, 494; Otis
Elev. Co. v. Long, 238 Mass. 257, 264, 13o N.E. 265, 268 (1921); Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655,
59 N.W. 8o6 (1894); West v. Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co., ii8 Neb. 544, 548, 225 N.W. 673, 675
(1929) (extension of time; alternative decision); Crudup v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co.,
56 Okla. 786, 793, I56 Pac. 899, 902 (i9i6). Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § i2o3 (1893).
"'s Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Natchez Inv. Co., Inc., i6i Miss. 198, 219, 222, 132 So. 535,
538, 135 id. 497 (193) (materialman received secured note from owner in lieu of payment by
owner to contractor and by latter to materialman, when bond provided that payments by
owner to contractor should be in cash).

PROTECTION OF LABORERS AND MATERIALMEN

the bond was conditioned solely on the payment of persons furnishing
4
labor or materials."Y
It makes no difference whether the bond on which the materialman's 5
right rests was given in obedience to a statute requiring a bond conditioned on the payment of his claim and also vesting in him a right to receive payment or to sue, or the use or benefit thereof;" 6 or in obedience
to a statute requiring such a bond but not determining its legal effect; or,
in the absence of any such statute, at least if the materials were furnished
7
before the variation of risk took place."
The like statement may be made concerning the premature payment of
a retained percentage of the contract price by the owner to the principal,","
or a payment made or work accepted without procuring receipt or other
evidence of the satisfaction of claims for labor or materials,"x9 or, it is believed, the surrender of a security res by the owner to the principal. Nor
does it matter that the time for the completion of the work as fixed by the
contract between the owner and the principal had expired when the labor
or materials were furnished.-=°
Likewise, while failure of the owner to pay to the principal an agreed
Steffes v. Lemke, 4o Minn. 27, 41 N.W. 302 (1889).
The same statement may be made as to persons furnishing labor, supplies, equipment,
money, or the like, if they are within the coverage of the bond.
z6 Dewey v. The State, ex rel. McCollum, gr Ind. 173, 184 (1883).
14

11S

"17 Dol v. Crume, 4 Neb. 655, 59 N.W. 8o6 (1894).
218United States F. & G. Co. v. Omaha Bldg. & Const. Co., i6 Fed. 145 (C.C.A. 8th 1902);
Chaffee v. United States F. & G. Co., 128 Fed. 918 (C.C.A. 8th 19o4); Maryland Cas. Co. v.

Portland Const. Co., 71 F. (2d) 658, 661 (C.C.A. 2d 1934); Dewey v. The State, ex rel. McCollum, 91 Ind. 173, 183 (1883); Getchell & Martin Lumber Co. v. Peterson & Sampson, 124 Iowa
599, 100 N.W. 550 (1904) (private construction; alternative decision); Standard Asphalt &
Rubber Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99 Kan. 567, 162 Pac. 299 (1917), L.R.A. 1917C 490; School

Dist. of Kansas City v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S.W. 507 (I899) (no statute requiring bond to
be conditioned on payment of materialmen; materials already furnished); Doll v. Crume, 41
Neb. 655, 59 N.W. 8o6 (1894) (bond not required by statute); Kaufmann v. Cooper, 46 Neb.
644, 65 N.W. 796 (1896) (bond not required by statute); King v. Murphy, 49 Neb. 67o, 68

N.W. 1029 (x896) (bond not required by statute); Des Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Marxen,
87 Neb. 684, 128 N.W. 31 (igio); Southwestern Sash & Door Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co.,
37 N.M. 212, 20 Pac. (2d) 928 (1933); Webb v. Freng, I8i Wis. 39, 44, 194 N.W. 155, 157
(1923) (statute provided that no change in the contract should release the sureties). Cal. Code
Civ. Proc., § 1203 (1931).
Contra: Bullar v. Norton, 107 Tex. 571, 578, 182 S.W. 668, 670 (1916).
Aetna Ind. Co. v. Indianapolis Mortar & Fuel Co., 178 Ind. 70, 74, 98 N.E. 706, 708

"19

(1912)

(acceptance of work); Des Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Marxen, 87 Neb. 684,

128

N.W. 3' (igo) (payment).
" Los Angeles Stone Co. v. National Sur. Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 Pac. 79 (1918); Hub Hard-

ware Co. v. Aetna Acc. & Ind. Co., 178 Cal.

264,

268, 173 Pac. 81, 82 (1918).
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instalment of the contract price, if unjustified,121 may lead to the discharge
of the surety from his obligation to the owner, because withholding from
the principal the means of pursuing the work varied the surety's risk, still
the right of the materialman against the surety should not be, defeated
thereby.122
The reason for these conclusions is that the bond is of a dual nature in
that it contains several undertakings running to the owner, one for his
own protection and the others for the benefit of persons furnishing labor
or materials, and hence creating several rights, the result being that the
owner's acts have no more legal effect on the rights of such other persons
3
than if separate bonds had been executed.
It would seem, however, that if the character of the work is so changed
that it becomes a different work, whether by arrangement with the owner
or not, the surety is relieved from payment for labor and materials thereafter furnished, because the work is now outside of the coverage of the
bond, as is more fully discussed in sub-topic III-C.
A ruling somewhat analogous to the doctrine of this sub-topic is presented by StandardAccident Insurance Co. v. Simpson." 4 In that case the
plaintiff, who had furnished materials to a subcontractor for use "in and
about the construction" of a highway, recovered judgment against the
surety of the contractor, notwithstanding that the consent of the county
to the subletting of the work had not been procured as the principal contract required.
121 Otherwise, of course, if the failure to pay were justified, for example, because of the filing
of liens for labor or materials already furnished, or the imminence of such filing. YawkeyCrowley Lumber Co. v. Sinaiko, I89 Wis. 298, 206 N.W. 976 (1926).
-Glades County v. Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co., 57 F. (2d) 449, 451 (C.C.A. 5th 1932).
123 School Dist. of Kansas City v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S.W. 507 (1899) (citing 137 N.Y.

488); Lyman v. City of Lincoln, 38 Neb. 794, 57 N.W. 531 (1894); Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655,
59 N.W. 8o6 (1894).
-4 64 F. (2d) 583, 589 (C.C.A. 4 th 1933).

